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Abstract: This paper aims at testing the degree of interaction between Portuguese 
municipalities’ expenditure levels by estimating a dynamic panel model, based on 
jurisdictional reaction functions. The analysis is performed for all 278 Portuguese mainland 
municipalities from 1986 to 2006, using alternative ways to measure neighbourhood. Results 
indicate that local governments’ spending decisions are significantly influenced by the 
actions of neighbouring municipalities. For total expenditures, there is evidence that a 10% 
increase in nearby municipalities’ expenditures boosts expenditures in a given municipality 
by around 3.8%.   
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1. Introduction 
Strategic interaction among governments has been a significant matter in public 
finance and regional science for quite a long time. However, most of the empirical studies1 
estimate reaction functions for taxes, and the lack of studies focusing on local expenditures 
interaction is striking. This paper builds on this literature by investigating if Portuguese local 
governments’ spending decisions influence each other. This is a major issue to understand 
the distribution of expenditures across municipalities, and the impact of budget 
decentralization policies.  
To our knowledge, interactions between Portuguese local governments have never 
been investigated. Veiga and Veiga (2007) found strong evidence of strategic manipulation 
of expenditures’ levels and composition by mayors, as more is spent in election years on 
items that are highly visible to the electorate. They control for transfers received from the 
central government and for the demographic and political characteristics of the 
municipalities. However, they did not take into account that the actions of a local government 
may affect the policy decisions of its neighbours. An important finding of the present paper is 
that an increase in a municipality’s neighbours’ expenditures increases its own expenditures, 
and that this is particularly relevant for investment decisions. 
Portugal is an interesting case study because municipalities are all subject to the 
same rules and legislation, have the same policy instruments and resources at their 
disposal, and local politicians have some discretionary power over them. Additionally, a large 
and detailed data set is available (all mainland municipalities from 1986 to 2006), allowing 
the analysis of spending in specific categories. We find that for total, current and capital 
expenditures, and particularly for investment, spending in other municipalities matters 
significantly. On investment components, Transportation Material, Machinery and 
Equipment; and Rural Roads seem to be particularly relevant. Furthermore, in mainland 
Portugal there is only one level of local government and, therefore, the estimated magnitude 
                                                 
1
 See Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) for surveys. 
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of municipalities’ fiscal interaction cannot be attributed to vertical externalities among 
different levels of authorities, as may occur in many countries that have a multi-tier structure 
of government. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the 
literature, and section 3 describes the Portuguese institutional framework. In section 4, the 
empirical methodology is laid out, and in section 5 the empirical results are presented. 
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 Since the early 1990s, interest in spatial interaction between economic agents has 
grown remarkably. Although several theoretical studies on how and why actions taken by a 
local government may affect other local governments appeared earlier,2 analyses using 
spatial econometric methods only then started to emerge and are still rather scarce.3 
Interjurisdictional interaction is largely acknowledged in the fiscal federalism 
literature4 and its consequences in terms of policy choices and efficiency have been broadly 
studied. The traditional theory of fiscal federalism (Musgrave, 1959; Stigler, 1957; and 
Oates, 1972) presents a framework in which the central government is responsible for the 
macroeconomic stabilization function, income redistribution, and the supply of a number of 
national public goods; and the lower levels of government are in charge of another part of 
the allocation function, which implies differentiated provision of goods and services whose 
consumption is limited to their own jurisdiction. However, the decentralization theorem 
(Oates, 1972), which establishes this provision system on the basis of economic efficiency, 
holds only if there are no interjurisdictional externalities. In the context of benefit spillovers 
between jurisdictions it is required that the Pigouvian rationale of subsidies is applied to 
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 See Wilson (1999) for a survey on tax competition literature. 
3
 Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) survey the empirical research on strategic interaction among 
local governments. 
4
 See Oates (1999) for a survey. 
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intergovernmental grants: the government ought to provide matching grants so that the 
policy-makers and the electorate internalize such benefits (Oates 2005). Other possible 
solutions are the reassignment of boundaries, voluntary agreements, or the enforcement of 
cooperation through the creation of a higher level of government (Haughaut 1999). The 
consequences of expenditure spillovers, in terms of efficiency and the design of federal 
structures, have been broadly discussed in the literature by authors such as Williams (1966), 
Oates (1972 and 2005), Wellisch (1993) and Conley and Dix (1999).  
The empirical literature on strategic interaction between decentralised levels of 
government is typically divided into three categories: tax and welfare competition, benefit 
spillovers, and yardstick competition. The first includes models where a jurisdiction is 
affected by the choices of other jurisdictions as a result of the existence of a particular 
resource that they share: the tax-competition literature studies how taxes are chosen 
strategically when they are levied by governments on a mobile tax base, and that on welfare 
competition analyses the strategic choices of governments regarding welfare benefit levels, 
as a result of the mobility of the poor. Examples of the latter include Brueckner (1998), 
Saavedra (2000), Fiva and Rattso (2006). Research on benefit spillovers in local public 
expenditures investigates if some expenditures of a jurisdiction derive benefits to similarly 
situated ones, and assesses how they induce interactions between neighbourhood 
jurisdictions’ decisions as to a particular variable (usually expenditures). Empirical literature 
examining the size of these spillovers is fairly thin. Finally, yardstick competition models, 
often considered to fit the benefit spillover framework, assess how voters, in an asymmetric 
information setting, use neighbouring jurisdictions’ public services and taxes to judge their 
own government’s performance. Not having complete information on the cost of public 
goods and services, they compare the expenditures and tax levels they face with those most 
easily observable – those of nearby jurisdictions. Besley and Case (1995) presented the first 
theoretical framework of yardstick competition and empirical evidence using US state data. 
Since the main purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent to which municipalities’ 
spending is influenced by the spending of neighbouring municipalities, we will focus our 
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attention on empirical studies of benefit spillovers. The pioneering work of Case, Rosen and 
Hines (1993) formalises a model for the United States, in which a jurisdiction’s welfare is 
assumed to depend, among others, on the public spending in neighbourhood jurisdictions. 
Neighbour is defined not only in terms of geographic proximity, but also in terms of economic 
and demographic similarities. Their results provide strong evidence that states’ expenditures 
are significantly influenced by those of their neighbours, in line with theoretical models of 
benefit spillovers among jurisdictions.  
Since Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), several studies have improved our 
understanding of how and to what extent spillovers result from local expenditure policies. 
Among others, Revelli (2003) builds up a theoretical framework with horizontal and vertical 
fiscal externalities in a multi-tier structure of government, in order to assess the source of 
spatial dependence between English local governments’ expenditures. He concludes that, 
when vertical interaction is accounted for, the magnitude of the horizontal interactions 
significantly decreases. Baicker (2005) uses exogenous shocks to state medical spending in 
the US to examine the effect of that spending on neighbouring states. She finds substantial 
spillover effects, and concludes that states are most influenced by neighbouring states from 
or to which their citizens are most likely to move. Finally, Solé-Ollé (2006) presents a 
framework to analyse and test for two types of expenditure spillovers: benefit spillovers and 
crowding spillovers, which arise from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighbouring 
jurisdictions. Estimations of expenditure reaction functions for Spanish local governments 
reveal that spillovers are stronger in urban areas than in the rest of the country, and that 
both kinds of spillovers occur in the suburbs, while for the city centres only crowding 
spillovers are relevant. 
 All the above mentioned studies used maximum-likelihood or instrumental variables 
to address the problem of endogeneity of the expenditure interaction variable, since 
expenditure in one jurisdiction depends on expenditure in another jurisdiction, but the 
reverse is also true. Recently, a growing body of research has started to implement the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the context of spatial interaction. Using a 
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dynamic panel of European Union countries, Redoano (2007) finds evidence of strategic 
behaviour by central governments on taxes and expenditures. She concludes that: (1) for 
corporate taxes, European countries follow large countries, while for income and public 
expenditures, fiscal interactions are driven by yardstick competition; (2) interdependency 
decreases when countries join the EU. Foucault, Madies and Paty (2008) test the existence 
of public spending interactions between French municipalities in a dynamic panel data 
model. Their results suggest the existence of spending interactions in investment and 
primary expenditures between neighbouring municipalities and between cities whose mayors 
have the same partisan affiliation. They find evidence of opportunistic behaviour in pre-
electoral periods (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), but not of yardstick competition.  
 
3. Portuguese Institutional Framework 
According to the Portuguese Constitution, there are three types of local governments: 
parishes (freguesias), municipalities, and administrative regions. However, administrative 
regions have not yet been implemented in mainland Portugal, due to the rejection of the 
proposal to institute them in a national referendum, in 1998; there are only two autonomous 
regions: Azores and Madeira. In the mainland there are currently 278 municipalities,5 and in 
the autonomous regions 30. Our data set does not include these 30 overseas municipalities, 
given the differences in the territorial organization, the fact that inhabitants of the islands 
may have different needs from those living in continental Europe, and that the status of ultra-
peripheral regions allows them to receive additional European Union’s funds. We focus our 
attention on municipalities because freguesias, which are the lowest administrative unit in 
Portugal, have a very limited scope of functions. 
Local governments in Portugal have their own property and finances, and are all 
subject to the same laws and regulations. Since the reestablishment of democracy in 
Portugal, in April 1974, there has been a progressive decentralization of competencies from 
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 Three municipalities were created in 1998: Trofa, Odivelas and Vizela. 
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the Central Government to local authorities. Nevertheless, Portugal is still among the most 
centralized countries in the European Union (EU). The Local Power Law of 1977 (Law 
79/77) defined the competencies of municipalities and the division of power among their 
organs of sovereignty,6 emphasising infrastructural interventions, such as the improvement 
of accessibilities, sewage, and the distribution of water and electricity. In 1984, new 
legislation (Decree-Law 77/84) was approved enlarging municipalities’ competencies to 
areas such as rural and urban equipment, culture, leisure and sports, transportation and 
communication, education, and health care. When Portugal joined the European Economic 
Community, in 1986, the financial situation of municipalities improved considerably, as they 
started receiving European structural and cohesion funds. Increased resources allowed 
municipalities to implement several measures that had been delayed due to lack of funds, 
and to devote greater care to other activities, such as the promotion of culture. Furthermore, 
more attention was paid to territorial organization and to the establishment of networks with 
foreign municipalities, namely Spanish jurisdictions near the border. A new law was enacted 
in 1999 (Law 159/99), which extended municipalities’ attributions regarding the provision of 
social and cultural services, urban rehabilitation, protection of the environment, consumer 
protection, promotion of touristic activities, territorial planning and urbanism, external 
cooperation, and the attraction of corporate activities. Finally, the current Local Finance Law 
(Law 2/2007) assigned new responsibilities to municipalities in the areas of education and 
healthcare, among others. 
Municipalities account for the bulk of consolidated expenditures of the local 
administrations. Municipal public expenditures are divided into capital and current 
expenditures. The former include investment, their main component, capital transfers to 
parishes, financial assets and liabilities, and other capital expenditures. Until 2001, 
investment expenditures included miscellaneous constructions (and subcomponents), 
acquisition of land, housing, transportation material, machinery and equipment, other 
                                                 
6
 Legislative power in municipalities belongs to the Municipal Assembly, while the executive power 
rests with the Town Council, where the mayor has a prominent role. 
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buildings (and subcomponents), and other investments.7 As for current expenditures, their 
sub-components are expenditures on goods and services, financial expenditures, human 
resources, current transfers to parishes, and other current expenditures.  
Municipalities have little capacity to influence the amount of revenues they receive, 
since transfers from the Central Government8 represent their main source of revenue, and 
local revenues are constrained by law.  They have more autonomy to establish their 
expenditure levels and composition. Therefore, this paper focuses on expenditures to test for 
interactions between neighbouring municipalities. It is important to note that mayors have 
greater control over investment expenditures than over current expenditures, since items 
such as salaries are quite rigid. Furthermore, investment expenditures can be used by local 
decision makers to attract corporate activity and households, and to gain votes in municipal 
elections.  
 
4. Empirical Framework and Econometric Procedure 
The purpose of this paper is to test for strategic interaction in per capita expenditure 
levels in Portuguese municipalities, in a dynamic panel framework. If there is interaction, 
jurisdiction i’s spending levels depend not only on their own economic and demographic 
characteristics, but also on the spending levels chosen by nearby municipalities. There can 
be either positive or negative correlation in local public expenditure levels, depending on the 
effect that the neighbour jurisdictions’ expenditures have on the marginal utility of a given 
municipality’s public spending. They will have a positive effect if public goods or services 
supplied by these neighbours are complements of the municipality’s own goods, and a 
negative effect if they are substitutes. Municipality i’s reaction function can be described as: 
                                                 
7
 In 2002, investment accounts were reorganized into the following categories: acquisition of land, 
buildings and other constructions (and subcomponents), transportation material, machinery and 
equipment and, finally, others. 
8
 For a revision of the laws regulating transfers from the Central Government to municipalities, and an 
analysis of the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants, see Veiga and 
Pinho (2007). 
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itititit munWGG εβαβ +++= 21                                         (1) 
where Git is real per capita expenditure in jurisdiction i at time t; WGit is a weighted average 
of neighbouring municipality’s real per capita expenditures (W is a geographical weighted 
matrix), that is, ∑
≠
=
ij
jtijtit GwWG ; munit is a vector of economic and demographic variables 
for each jurisdiction, affecting their fiscal choices, and εit is an error term.  
The rationale behind this is that citizens may derive benefits from public goods and 
services provided by their own municipality and by neighbouring municipalities. Thus, a 
welfare maximizing government will maximize the following objective function:  
F(Git, WGit; munit)                                                    (2) 
 Solving the first order condition, a given municipality i will choose Git according to the 
reaction function Git = R(WGit; munit), which consists of its best response to the decisions of 
other municipalities, taking into account its own characteristics. If there are no spillovers 
regarding public expenditures, then WGit does not enter the reaction function – the 
coefficient α in equation (1) will be zero. 
 In a regression framework the dependent variable is the logarithm of real per capita 
expenditures. Several items of expenditure are considered alternatively: total expenditures, 
capital expenditures, current expenditures, and investment expenditures and its main 
components.  
 
4.1. Specification of the weight matrix 
It is highly important to properly select a criterion to define neighbours, given that a 
misspecification of the weight matrix may lead to inconsistent estimates and affect the 
coefficients’ interpretation (Anselin, 1988). Several approaches have been followed to 
specify the elements of the weight matrix, and no consensus has been achieved on which is 
better suited for spatial econometric analysis. The matrix has to be specified according to a 
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criterion that reflects previous expectations about the spatial pattern of interaction. It has 
zero diagonal values, which means municipalities are not considered its own neighbours.  
A commonly used method is to assign weights based on contiguity.9 One way to 
apply this scheme is to assign values of 0 and 1 to the structure of neighbours – binary 
contiguity. This would imply wij = 1/mi for municipalities j that share a border with municipality 
i, and wij = 0 otherwise; where mi is the number of municipalities contiguous to i. Such matrix 
(W0), was created for our sample and later used in the estimation for total expenditures, as a 
robustness test. However, as discussed by Anselin (1988), this method does not supply a 
full representation of the degree of spatial interaction present in the data. It is frequent, after 
Cliff and Ord (1981), to assign different weights to the neighbours, according to the degree 
to which they affect municipality i, so that 1=∑ ijj w .10 Different weights may be assigned 
according to geographical distance, or other variables affecting interactions, namely 
demographic or economic variables.  
Following several papers in the literature, we also defined neighbours according to 
the Euclidean distance between the centres of the municipalities, and constructed the 
weights as the inverse of this measure. Firstly, and given that Portugal is a relatively small 
country, all municipalities were considered neighbours (WT). Secondly, and in order to 
investigate the robustness of the results, we limited the municipalities that are considered 
neighbours to those that distance x or less kilometres (Wx), with x = 50 and 100 km. This is 
because benefits are more likely to be internalized by municipalities that are closer. In all the 
specifications the effect of neighbours is smaller the further away they are. The choice of 
100km was based on the fact that the maximum frequency of distances between Portuguese 
municipalities is for 100km, and that of 50km was based on the limits generally used in 
empirical literature on spillovers between local governments. Additionally, 50km is the 
distance from which a journey is considered medium or long distance.   
                                                 
9
 See Besley and Case (1995). 
10
 See, for example, Case, Rosen and Hines (1993). 
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 Hence, municipality i’s expenditures are assumed to be affected by the expenditures 
of all its neighbours, in inverse proportion to their distances to i and are normalized 
afterwards, so that 1=∑ ijj w . Thus, wij is defined as: 
∑
=
j
ij
ij
ij
dist
dist
w 1
1
       or         







= ∑
0
1
1
j ij
ij
ij dist
dist
w
       if xkmd ij ≤<0               (3) 
 
for the first (WT) and second (Wx) specifications, respectively. Hence, each observation Git is 
associated to its spatially lagged counterpart, ∑
≠
=
ij
jtijtit GwWG , which is a linear combination 
of the observations for all i’s neighbours. 
As a result, four matrices were created: one based on geographical contiguity and 
three distance decay matrices. Each W is, therefore, a 275x275 matrix for the period 1986-
1998, and a 278x278 matrix, for the period 1999-2006, with zero diagonal elements.11 
We chose the geographical criterion to compute the weight matrix because benefit 
spillovers depend on the mobility of the population, which, in turn, depends on the distance 
between municipalities. Other possibilities, such as matrices based on political, demographic 
or economic similarities, are usually applied to other behavioural models, but were not 
considered in the current analysis. 
 
4.2. Econometric issues 
According to the model, municipality i’s expenditures in year t depend on municipality 
j’s expenditures, and municipality’s j’s expenditures also depend on those of i. If 
municipalities react to each other’s spending decisions contemporaneously, then WGjt is 
endogenous in model (1) and correlated with the contemporaneous error term: 
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 Three municipalities were created in 1998: Trofa, Odivelas and Vizela. 
otherwise 
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{ } 0≠Ε ititWGε                                                      (4)  
In this situation, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent and there are two 
possible solutions: Maximum Likelihood and Instrumental Variables. The first solution 
consists in inverting the system, in order to eliminate the dependent variables from the right-
hand side of the estimating equation, and using a non-linear optimization routine to estimate 
the spatial coefficient. Examples of papers using this approach are Case et al. (1993), 
Besley and Case (1995), Brueckner (1998) and Foucault et al. (2008). However, this 
procedure is computationally demanding, especially with a large dataset with panel 
observations. 
Another possible solution for this problem would be an instrumental variable two-
stage least squares (2SLS) procedure, using as instruments the neighbours’ variables 
(munjt) that influence their fiscal decisions and are not correlated with the error term. Thus, in 
line with numerous empirical studies, these would be all considered strictly exogenous and 
would be weighted by W. Several papers have used this method successfully, such as 
Kelejian and Robinson (1993), Revelli (2002) and Solé-Ollé (2006). 
 Another empirical problem concerning the estimation of a spatial model is that there 
may be spatial dependence in the error term, given by: 
εit = λWεit + µit                                                     (5) 
where µit is a white noise error term, uncorrelated between municipalities. If this error 
correlation is ignored, false evidence of strategic interaction may be provided by the 
estimation. ML solves this by incorporating this error structure, and IV generates consistent 
estimates of α even in the presence of spatial error correlation (Kelejian and Prucha 1998). 
 Due to the fact that we are dealing with panel data, we have to consider unobserved 
heterogeneity. Thus, we augmented equation (1) with an individual municipality effect. 
Additionally, we included time effects, with year specific intercepts, in order to control for 
macroeconomic variables that affect all municipalities at the same time. As noted by Case et 
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al. (1993), these are particularly important so that spending correlations between 
jurisdictions caused by common national level shocks are not given spatial significance.  
 Finally, according to Veiga and Veiga (2007), Portuguese municipalities’ level of per 
capita real expenditures exhibits a high level of persistency. Hence, we also included a lag of 
the dependent variable, Gt-1. The model to be tested can, then, be specified as follows: 
ittiitititit munWGGG ερηβαγβ ++++++= − 211                      (6) 
where ηi is the individual effect and ρt are time effects. 
Because Gt-1 was included, by construction it will be correlated with the individual 
effect, ηi. In order to solve this problem, and following Arellano and Bond (1991), we can 
take first-differences of equation (6) to eliminate ηi and use as instruments for ∆Git-1  lagged 
levels of the dependent variable from two or more periods before – which are not correlated 
with the residuals in differences, assuming no serial correlation in εit. The neighbouring 
variable, being endogenous, can be instrumented in a similar way. Thus, the estimation may 
be conducted with instrumental variables, more specifically by the Generalized Method of 
Moments (as discussed in Arellano and Bond, 1991) – GMM – which combines the 
instruments efficiently. It does so by estimating the model parameters directly from the 
moment conditions. 
However, since we suspect high persistence in expenditures, the use of the System 
GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998) might be the 
appropriate solution. This extended estimator combines the moment conditions for the model 
in first differences and for the model in levels, and is especially suitable when there is a high 
level of persistency in the dependent variable – it is less biased and more precise. It also 
allows correcting for econometric problems such as weak instruments and measurement 
errors. Given its properties, we will consider this solution throughout our empirical analysis, 
comparing it, where appropriate, with the OLS, fixed-effects (FE) and GMM applied to first-
differences (GMM-Dif) alternatives. 
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The validity of the instruments later used in our estimations will be checked using the 
Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. We will specifically address the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in our data. Additionally, in each regression, following Arellano and Bond 
(1991), we will investigate whether the residuals are serially correlated. 
Several estimation procedures have been proposed for spatial models, but the only 
method that incorporates spatial dependence, temporal lags and other endogenous 
variables is the system GMM estimator (GMM-Sys).12 Recently, Kukenova and Monteiro 
(2008), by performing a Monte Carlo Investigation, found the extended GMM to be suitable 
to estimate dynamic spatial lag models, especially when N and/or T are large.  
 
4.3. Data and empirical model 
The empirical model consists of an equation where municipality i’s real per capita 
expenditure in year t (Git), depends on its lagged value, its own characteristics and on the 
real per capita expenditures of the neighbouring municipalities (Gjt) in the same year. The 
following variables are used to capture municipalities’ resources and needs: 
- grantit is total real per capita transfers from the central government. Since grants represent 
the main source of municipalities’ revenues, a positive and large coefficient is expected. 
Cap_grantit and curr_grantit are, respectively, capital grants and current grants. They are 
included, instead of total grants, in the regressions having as a dependent variable capital, 
investment and its components, and current expenditures. 
- taxesit, the per capita real municipal taxes, are included with the same purpose, and a 
positive, but smaller, coefficient is expected. 
- popdensit represents the population density, in jurisdiction i at time t. It proxies for the level 
of urbanisation and allow us to test for congestion effects or scale economies in the 
provision of local public goods and services. 
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 For a description of estimators dealing with spatial and time dependence in panel datasets see 
Kukenova and Monteiro (2008). 
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- In order to pick up differences in population needs, we consider the dependency ratio 
(dependit), which is the proportion of population in the municipality that is under 15 years old 
and over 65. These groups of the population demand specific services that are provided by 
local authorities, such as elementary education and facilities for the elderly. 
All variables are expressed in logarithm, except for the population density and the 
percentage of dependent population, so the results can be interpreted as elasticities. 
 The data set contains annual data on all Portuguese mainland municipalities, for the 
years 1986 to 2006. Given that three municipalities13 were only created in 1998, from 1986 
to 1998 there are only data for 275 municipalities. Data on municipalities’ local accounts 
were obtained from the Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais’s (DGAL) annual publication 
Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). That on population and consumer price indexes 
was collected from Marktest’s Sales Index (SI) and the proportions of population under 15 
and over 65 were collected from the Regional Statistical Yearbook, of the Portuguese 
Institute of Statistics (INE). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Portuguese 
municipalities have an average of 540.28 euros per capita for total expenditures in the period 
in analysis, with a standard deviation of 317.4. Current expenditures account for around 51% 
of total expenditures, with capital expenditures representing the other 49%. Of the latter, 
about 81% are investment expenditures.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
5. Results 
Empirical results are presented in Tables 2 to 4. Our key estimates are discussed in 
Section 5.1, Table 2, where we estimate equation (6) for Total, Capital, Current, and 
Investment Expenditures, using WT as the weight matrix. In Section 5.2, we test for 
alternative weighting matrices, estimating equation (6) for Total expenditures. Finally, under 
Section 5.3, we extend our empirical analysis to investment components. Throughout the 
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 Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela. 
 16 
analysis we implement a similar GMM-Sys strategy, which facilitates the comparison of 
results obtained for different dependent variables and weighting matrices. 
 
5.1. Total, Capital, Current, and Investment Expenditures 
Table 2 presents estimation results for total, capital, current and investment real per 
capita expenditures. For total expenditures, we estimate equation (6) by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE) and System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-Sys) 
in columns (1) to (6). For the remaining dependent variables, we only estimate the model by 
GMM-Sys. In all specifications we estimate equation (6) with and without neighbouring 
expenditures. The spatial dependence variable was computed using the matrix WT, which 
considers all Portuguese municipalities as neighbours, with weights in inverse proportion to 
the distances between them. For the GMM-Sys we use the two-step estimation with the 
finite-sample correction for standard errors suggested by Windmeijer (2005). For all 
specifications we include time specific dummies. The reported statistics are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the errors. Since we suspect the errors are non-
spherical, we report the Hansen consistent test instead of the Sargan statistic. 
For the GMM regressions discussed below, we instrument, for the differenced 
equations, first-differences of the dependent variable using its levels lagged at least two 
periods, and its lagged first-differences as instruments for the level equations. Grants, taxes 
and neighbouring municipalities expenditures are assumed to be endogenous, and are 
instrumented similarly to lagged own expenditures. The argument is that transfers from the 
central government and taxes collected by municipalities can be, to some extent, influenced 
by local governments. Finally, the demographic variables, as well as the time dummies, are 
assumed as exogenous. We based this belief on the fact that municipalities have little or no 
control over demographic variables (such as population density and the percentage of 
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people under 15 and over 65). Furthermore, any shocks that may affect the entire country, 
which are controlled for by time dummies, are also exogenous to individual municipalities. 
Our first result (OLS, columns (1) and (2), Table 2) indicates that total expenditures 
show some degree of persistence. Focusing on our key explanatory variable, neighbouring 
total expenditures, we conclude that there are positive spillover effects across municipalities. 
When accounting for unobserved municipality specific effects, in columns (3) and (4), we 
corroborate the results obtained by OLS. Although OLS and FE produce biased estimates, 
due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand-side of equation (6), 
they provide a useful benchmark on what we should expect from the consistent GMM 
estimates. 
The serial correlation pattern in the first-differenced residuals in models (5) and (6), 
by showing a significant AR2 (and insignificant AR3), indicates that we need to instrument 
the equations in first-differences with three lags of the dependent variable, and first-
differences lagged two periods for the equations in levels. Additionally, we restrict the 
instruments for first-differences equations to five lags. In order to limit the number of 
instruments, we have not applied each moment condition underlying the system-GMM 
procedure to each time period and lag available. Instead, we apply a single moment 
condition for each period and regressor.14 This restriction was not applied in the definition of 
the instruments of neighbouring total expenditures, column (6), which justifies the significant 
increase in instruments from column (5) to column (6). 
By estimating our model using the GMM system procedure we confirm that total 
expenditures exhibit some persistence, revealed through an estimated coefficient of 0.43 for 
lag total expenditures, which is statistically significant at the 1% level – column (6). This 
might result from the fact that municipalities’ spending decisions are highly dependent on 
their resources and on their population needs, which are also persistent over time. The 
                                                 
14
 The model has been estimated with Stata’s command XTABOND2, and the option ‘collapse’ has 
been used to define the instruments for Git-1, Grant and Taxes. 
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exclusion of neighbouring total expenditures, column (5), does not significantly alter the level 
of persistency in the series. 
Focusing on column (6), we conclude that the elasticity of own expenditures with 
respect to neighbouring total expenditures is significant and about 0.38: a one percent 
increase in neighbours’ expenditures is associated with an increase in own expenditures of 
about 0.38%, confirming the existence of complementarity or mimicking effects. This result 
clearly indicates that total expenditures spill over municipalities; i.e., own expenditures vary 
positively with neighbours’ decisions regarding this variable. There is strong evidence in 
favour of expenditure interactions among Portuguese municipalities – the variable WGjt is 
statistically significant and positively signed. 
Both grants and taxes are statistically significant and have the expected signs, with a 
larger coefficient for the former, derived from the fact that transfers from the central 
government are municipalities’ main source of revenue. The density of the population and, 
particularly, the share of dependent population, exert a positive and statistically significant 
effect on total expenditures. This result confirms our prior that the elderly and the youth 
demand for specific services that local governments try to satisfy, namely kindergartens, 
elementary education, sport infrastructures, and day care for the eldest.  
The tests for serial correlation in the error term reveal, as expected, negative serial 
correlation in first-differences, which disappears for third and higher orders. This result 
follows from the formulation of equation (6), and constitutes a first validation of the 
instruments used. The Hansen test’s statistic is 111.0, has 96 degrees of freedom, and an 
associated p-value of 0.14. This result validates the instrument set used in the estimation of 
column (6). A similar conclusion is valid for the estimates presented in column (5). 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Moving to capital expenditures, Table 2, columns (7) and (8), the estimated 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is slightly smaller than the one estimated for 
total expenditures. Previous results extend to capital expenditures; i.e., capital expenditures 
are positively determined by grants and taxes. The information conveyed by the serial 
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correlation tests, AR(1) to AR(3), together with the Hansen test, validate de instruments 
used in our regressions. For both estimations, columns (7) and (8), the p-value of the 
Hansen test is bounded between 0.15 and 0.23, and the serial correlation in first-differenced 
residuals disappears after two lags. The estimated coefficient associated with capital 
expenditures of neighbouring municipalities is statistically significant at the 5% level, large 
and positively signed. At the same time, the grants’ elasticity has increased considerably: a 
10% increase in grants induces almost a 4% increase in capital expenditures. One possible 
explanation of why the spatial interaction coefficient is only statistically significant at the 5% 
level for capital expenditures is that there might be opposite effects on the various 
components of these expenditures that balance each other out. Investment expenditures 
represent the bulk of Capital expenditures (around 80%), and, therefore, we test for this 
hypothesis in subsequent regressions (columns 11 and 12).  
 Moving to current expenditures, columns (9) and (10), reveals a different pattern in 
terms of residual serial correlation. As we can see in the AR tests, residual’s serial 
correlation only disappears after 3 lags. This implies that in the instrument set we use 
current expenditures lagged three to five periods for first-differences equations, and first-
differences of current expenditures lagged two periods for equations in levels. The remaining 
variables are instrumented as discussed above. Focusing our attention on column (10), the 
model with neighbouring current expenditures, we now observe that there are spillovers of 
this item across municipalities: a 10% increase in neighbours’ expenditures brings about a 
3.1% increase in own current expenditures. Persistence is now much higher, when 
compared to the previous expenditure variables. This is consistent with the economic theory, 
since local governments may not be able to make sudden changes in their fiscal choices, 
either because they have too high adjustment costs or because they are blocked by law, 
namely regarding the wage policy and firing decisions.15 This is particularly true for current 
expenditures, which are usually set in advance for several years and are not easily 
changeable. Furthermore, grants, taxes and the demographic variables, although correctly 
                                                 
15
 Expenditures with employees represent around 50% of current expenditures. 
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signed, seem to have a smaller impact when compared to the previous two items. Overall, 
estimations under columns (9) and (10) are validated by the serial correlation and Hansen 
tests.16 
Finally, investment expenditures reveal significant and large overall investment 
spillovers from neighbouring expenditures with an elasticity of 0.92. There is also evidence 
that investment decisions depend on resources available. As before, the instrument set is 
validated. Given the relevance of this sort of expenditures we will discuss the spillovers for 
different investment components in Section 5.3. 
 
5.2. Alternative weighting matrices 
In order to test the robustness of the results regarding the use of the weighting 
matrix, we will now implement our analysis using three alternative weighting matrices 
described in section 4.1: binary/contiguity (W0), 50 kms (W50), and 100 kms (W100). The 
results are shown in Table 3. Columns (1) to (3) present distance decay results considering 
the contiguity matrix, while columns (4) and (5) consider 50km and 100km, respectively, as 
the maximum distance after which weights are set to zero. The binary/contiguity matrix (W0) 
assigns the value 1 to municipalities that share a border, and 0 otherwise. Throughout this 
section we only consider total expenditures as our dependent variable. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Not accounting for specific effects, Table 3, column (1), the elasticity of own 
expenditures to neighbouring total expenditures is quite small (0.04). However, this result is 
biased, as we ignore both the fixed unobserved effects and the lagged dependent variable. 
The inclusion of municipalities’ fixed effects (column 2) increases the degree to which local 
governments react to their neighbours expenditure decisions. In order to render our results 
more comparable to those presented in the previous section, we implement the system 
                                                 
16
 As with Total Expenditures, we do not restrict the number of instruments when defining the set of 
instruments for neighboring Current Expenditures, column (10), which explains the high number of 
instruments used in this regression. 
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GMM estimation17 (column 3) and the results clearly indicate the presence of neighbouring 
spillover effects. Analysing the results shown in columns (4) and (5), both estimated by 
GMM-Sys, not only do we reinforce the conclusion that there are spillovers of total 
expenditures between neighbours, but also that their size is determined by the weighting 
matrix we use. It is clear from our results that, when allowing for a broader definition of 
neighbourhood, we capture a higher effect of neighbours’ expenditures. Under the definition 
of 100 km neighbourhood, we estimate an elasticity of 0.51 (Table 3, column 5), while 
considering 50km neighbourhood (Table 3, column 5), we estimate such elasticity to be of 
about 0.32. This is understandable, given that the latter definition of neighbourhood is more 
restrictive. The remaining results are similar for all regressions. 
This set of results corroborates and strengthens the discussion and the options made 
in Section 5.1. As such, we conclude that there is strategic interaction regarding Portuguese 
municipalities’ total expenditure levels. 
  
5.3. Components of Investment Expenditures 
There is no reason to assume that patterns of expenditure interdependence are the 
same for all categories of investment. It is possible that some types of spending exert 
complementarity and others substitutability, cancelling each other out and reducing the 
aggregate effect. An analysis of aggregate spending levels might bias downward the effects 
of spillovers on spending. To investigate this possibility, the model defined in equation (6), 
and discussed in Section 5.1, is now implemented for the sub-components of investment 
expenditures. 
Until 2001, investment expenditures had seven main categories: (1) Acquisition of 
Land, (2) Housing, (3) Transportation Material, (4) Machinery and Equipment; (5) 
Miscellaneous Constructions; (6) Other Buildings, and (7) Other Investments. Miscellaneous 
                                                 
17
 Hansen tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to the GMM that only 
includes the first-differenced equations. 
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Constructions and Other Buildings were de-composed in, respectively, six and three 
subcomponents. When analysing the data set we realized that some of these items have a 
significant number of zeros and missing values, which led us to exclude some of them from 
the analysis.18 Table 4 shows the results for 11 of the 16 components and subcomponents of 
investment expenditures. In this table, we only report the estimated coefficient for WGit and 
its standard error. Additionally, for the GMM type regressions we report the statistic for the 
Hansen test, and its degrees of freedom.19 We report estimation results obtained when using 
the matrix WT, that is, the matrix that considers all municipalities as neighbours. The 
instrument set associated within each GMM regression is similar to the one discussed in 
Section 5.1 for investment expenditures. In order to keep the regressions as comparable as 
possible, we use the same structure to define the instruments, particularly in what concerns 
exogeneity/endogeneity, and the lags used for the instruments are the minimum required to 
validate the estimates. For each investment component we report the OLS, FE, and GMM-
Sys estimates. 
When using the GMM procedure there is evidence of positive spillovers across the 
border for Transportation material, Machinery and equipment, Overpasses, streets and 
complementary works, Rural Roads, and Other miscellaneous constructions. As before, the 
instrument set is validated, both by the serial correlation tests, and by the overidentification 
tests. When considering OLS and FE results, expenditure decisions on sewage also seem to 
depend on neighbours’ decisions. The significant coefficient for the spatial interaction 
variable associated with Rural roads may be due to coordination among neighbouring 
municipalities, since the road network is common to several jurisdictions. Regarding other 
items the positive strategic interaction is likely to be due to mimicking of nearby 
municipalities, since some expenditures may be used to attract households and firms.  
 
                                                 
18
 Acquisition of land, Housing, Infrastructures on solid waste treatment, Social equipment, and Other 
investments were excluded because they all have an average of more than 50 missing values or 
zeros per year. 
19
 Results for the entire regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Conclusion 
The paper aims at testing if there are significant interactions in Portuguese 
municipalities’ expenditure levels by estimating a dynamic panel data model, based on 
jurisdictional reaction functions. Strategic interaction is said to exist when a given 
municipality is more affected by the actions of nearby ones than of those which are more 
distant. This may be due to benefit spillovers that arise when neighbouring jurisdictions’ 
spending decisions have an impact on each other, because each jurisdiction derives utility, 
not only from its own expenditures, but also from those of its neighbours.  
The analysis was performed for all 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities from 
1986 to 2006. Given the persistence of the expenditure series, estimations were performed 
by GMM using alternative ways to measure neighbourhood. Results allow us to conclude 
that local governments do not make their spending decisions in isolation; they are 
significantly influenced by the actions of neighbouring municipalities. For total expenditures, 
there is evidence that a 10% increase in nearby municipalities’ expenditures increases 
expenditures in a given municipality by 3.8%, on average.  For current and, especially for 
capital expenditures, the effect is also visible at the aggregate level. Results also support the 
existence of strong benefit spillovers for investment expenditures, and for the sub-
components Transportation Material, Machinery and Equipment; and expenditures on 
constructions that require coordination among neighbouring municipalities.  
In future research, we intend to test for alternative weighting matrices, using 
demographic and political data. It would be interesting to test for yardstick competition and if, 
besides geographical proximity, political party similarity also plays a role in Portuguese 
mayors’ fiscal decisions.  
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 Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 No Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max 
Total Expenditures 5791 540.28 317.40 72.05 2315.13 
Current Expenditures 5791 277.76 170.40 41.45 1471.92 
Capital Expenditures 5791 262.50 179.20 13.48 1620.73 
Investment Expenditures 5791 213.71 156.37 10.08 1359.76 
Acquisition of land Expenditures 3460 7.57 12.62 0.0007 233.23 
Housing Expenditures 3009 15.67 31.29 0.0002 394.90 
Transportation material Expenditures 3998 6.41 7.78 0.008 88.99 
Machinery and equipment Expenditures 4359 11.86 11.48 0.009 146.35 
Miscellaneous constructions Expenditures 4398 127.85 113.04 0.07 1810.72 
Overpasses, streets and complementary works Expenditures 4230 31.11 38.01 0.0004 479.11 
Sewage Expenditures 3761 16.50 23.98 0.002 393.37 
Water treatment and distribution Expenditures 3726 19.63 29.42 0.001 570.88 
Rural roads Expenditures 3783 43.88 57.64 0.003 772.90 
Infrastructures and solid waste treatment Expenditures 1074 5.09 23.44 0.0001 561.10 
Other Miscellaneous Constructions Expenditures 4061 25.70 44.23 0.003 705.72 
Other buildings Expenditures 4393 34.02 38.61 0.02 531.77 
Sports, recreational and schooling facilities Expenditures 3951 14.55 24.64 0.001 361.29 
Social equipment Expenditures 1597 6.27 13.28 0.0003 237.66 
Other Expenditures in Other Buildings 4319 18.94 28.06 0.001 349.35 
Other investments Expenditures 2063 6.60 13.33 0.0003 191.87 
Total Grants 5791 363.15 282.35 37.10 3079.16 
Capital Grants 5790 194.64 175.41 5.89 2791.43 
Current Grants  5791 168.54 124.34 27.53 979.14 
Taxes 5791 41.10 76.43 0.06 1912.83 
Population (number of inhabitants) 5799 34827 57972 1767 727500 
Population Density (inhabitants per km) 5799 2.91 8.68 0.06 86.76 
Share of Dependent Population (%) 5799 35.88 4.14 17.10 58.19 
 
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years) 
Notes: Monetary values are expressed in real and per capita terms. The sample period goes from 
1986 to 2006, except for investment expenditures subcomponents, for which the period has been 
restricted to 2001.  
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Table 2 – Estimation Results for Total, Capital, Current and Investment Expenditures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
D. Variable 
Model 
TotExp 
OLS0 
TotExp 
OLS 
TotExp 
FE 
TotExp 
FE 
TotExp 
GMM 
TotExp 
GMM 
CapExp 
GMM 
CapExp 
GMM 
CurExp 
GMM 
CurExp 
GMM 
InvExp 
GMM 
InvExp 
GMM 
             
Git-1 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.54*** 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.87*** 0.73*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.0164) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
WGjt  0.15***  0.37***  0.38***  0.92**  0.31***  0.92** 
  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.36)  (0.09)  (0.42) 
Grant 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.38*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.50*** 0.39*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.12) 
Taxes 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.02 0.04*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.05) 
Depend -0.001 -0.002* 0.002 0.003* 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02 0.01 0.0004 0.002 0.02 0.01 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) (0.01) (0.009) 
Denspop 0.003*** 0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.0005 0.003* 0.0001 0.002 0.001* 0.002** -0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
             
Observations 5,508 5,508 5,508 5,508 5,508 5,508 5,507 5,507 5,508 5,508 5,507 5,507 
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.90         
Municipalities 
  278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 
AR1 
    -6.81 -9.47 -12.65 -12.72 -7.81 -7.58 -12.02 -11.81 
p-value 
    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR2 
    1.97 2.02 1.03 0.50 2.90 2.82 -0.20 -0.49 
p-value 
    0.05 0.04 0.30 0.62 0.004 0.005 0.84 0.62 
AR3 
    -1.84 -1.42 -1.09 -0.91 -0.46 -0.49 0.14 0.23 
p-value 
    0.07 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.64 0.62 0.89 0.82 
Hansen 
    7.45 111.0 12.04 10.61 12.01 152.4 25.00 26.27 
p-value 
    0.49 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.20 
DF 
    8 96 8 8 6 128 18 21 
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years). 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%, **5% and *10%. GMM stands for GMM 
system estimation; two-step estimation results are presented. AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) refer to first, second and third order autocorrelation tests. 
DF stands for degrees of freedom. In each model the dependent variable corresponds to D.Variable. 
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Table 3 – Estimation Results for different weighting matrices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Weighting Matrix Binary: W0 W50 W100 
Model OLS FE GMM-Sys GMM-Sys GMM-Sys 
      
Git-1 0.56*** 0.29*** 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
WGjt 0.04** 0.07*** 0.18** 0.32*** 0.51*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.17) 
Grant 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.16** 0.14** 0.14** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Taxes 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.11** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Depend -0.002 0.002 0.02*** 0.017*** 0.01* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
denspop 0.003** -0.002 0.0002 0.0007 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Observations 5,508 5,508 5508 5508 5508 
R2 0.94 0.90    
Municipalities  278 278 278 278 
AR(1)   -6.96 -7.24 -7.42 
p-value 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2)   1.70 1.62 1.60 
p-value 
  0.09 0.11 0.11 
Hansen test   6.84 6.77 6.02 
p-value 
  0.55 0.56 0.65 
DF   8 8 8 
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level for which the null hypothesis 
is rejected: ***1%, **5% and *10%. GMM-Sys estimations present two-step results. 
AR(1) and AR(2) refer to first and second order autocorrelation tests. DF stands for 
degrees of freedom. In each model the dependent variable is Total Expenditures. 
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Table 4 – Estimation Results for Some Investment Components 
 OLS FE GMM-Sys 
D. Variable   Coeff. Htest 
1. Acquisition of land   n.a n.a. n.a n.a 
    
2. Housing n.a n.a. n.a n.a 
    
3. Transportation material  0.71 0.23 0.69 68.13* 
(0.11)*** (0.20) (0.35)** [54] 
4. Machinery and equipment 0.72 -0.12 0.74 90.34* 
(0.09)*** (0.20) (0.17)*** [71] 
5. Miscellaneous constructions 0.10 0.24 0.28 29.83* 
(0.09) (0.13)* (0.67) [21] 
5.1. Overpasses, streets and complementary 
works 
0.46 0.32 0.81 56.83 
(0.15)*** (0.20) (0.49)* [55] 
5.2. Sewage 0.43 0.45 0.22 75.16 
(0.12)*** (0.24)* (0.36) [61] 
5.3. Water treatment and distribution 0.19 0.21 0.25 11.60 
(0.13) (0.20) (0.37) [12] 
5.4. Rural roads 0.71 0.48 0.69 77.69 
(0.16)*** (0.25)* (0.34)** [63] 
5.5. Infrastructures on solid waste treatment n.a n.a. n.a n.a 
    
5.6. Other Miscellaneous Constructions 0.05 -0.30 0.57 17.98 
(0.14) (0.19) (0.28)** [12] 
6. Other buildings   -0.19 -0.001 0.66 14.52 
(0.14) (0.18) (0.64) [12] 
6.1. Sports, recreational and schooling 
facilities 
-0.15 0.03 0.05 17.13 
(0.17) (0.19) (0.39) [12] 
6.2. Social equipment   n.a n.a. n.a n.a 
    
6.3. Other Expenditures in Other Buildings -0.24 -0.44 -0.56 25.28 
(0.15) (0.19)** (0.78) [20] 
7. Other investments   n.a n.a. n.a n.a 
    
Sources: INE, DGAL, SI (several years) 
Notes.: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Hansen test’s (H-test) degrees of freedom in 
brackets. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***1%, **5% and *10%. 
GMM-Sys estimations present two-step results. In each model the dependent variable 
corresponds to D. Variable. The reported coefficient and standard error is for the 
neighbouring variable. 
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